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[Dream: fundraising from rich individuals, \$20,000, to finance a production, a play or movie, perhaps to focus on me and to be narrated by me, on my experience with the nuclear planning. Problem is, we can't sign a lease on a building (for production?) because we don't know if it will be successful enough.

I play a role in the performance; a woman; with a wig? and low, woman's voice. My first acting.

Get money from Greene; from R----_---- in Boston?; Bert?

Use CDI video, to fund-raise (inc. Sperrys?);

To publish on the Web?

For a more ambitious film, with film clips illustrating nuclear age? (CDI help?)

Show agents, publishers?

Waking thoughts:

1. Current relevance of nuclear history: the experience of the US and SU (and the other NWS, nuclear weapon states) is likely to be reproduced, soon.

India and Pakistan may be about to launch a nuclear arms race much like that of the US and SU. India may test soon, followed by Pakistan, with Pakistan building missiles (with the help of China), and both sides deploying. This race may have the worst aspects of its predecessor, with both sides deploying vulnerable weapons with a vulnerable C3 system, and with an ongoing border war.

The same could be true for India and China.

The example may apply also to Israel and its neighbors, including Egypt and Iran. Already, as from the beginning of its program, Israel is imitating the US in blindness to the preeminent danger of a nuclear arms race and proliferation threatening its own survival, and blindness to the reality that these cannot be prevented in the context of its own nuclear ambitions, program and status.

With the non-proliferation framework breaking down entirely, Germany and Japan could go nuclear, spurring widespread proliferation. (Europe; Korea; Taiwan; Indonesia;...) (The more advanced states could afford more stable systems in terms of basing--submarines--and command and control. Yet...)

Each of these countries is likely to reproduce major aspects of the US-SU folly--perhaps all of it, in detail, in all its dangers, waste and horror--without knowing it, since the true, secret US-SU plans, actions and aims remain hidden and unknown, even in the US and Russia.

Revised Official secrecy still covers most of the documents. Not one participant in any NWS with real knowledge of nuclear war plans and posture has written a revelatory memoir. Nor have there been relevant hearings. Journalistic accounts have had little authority and gotten little attention.

2. My own account has the potential for a wider audience because it is part of a lifestory that leads up to the notorious history of the Pentagon Papers and Watergate (whose actual relation to the ending of the Vietnam War is also unknown).

Even without many documents (though that is a regrettable limitation) it can earn authority and persuasiveness by its verisimilitude, convincing personal perspective, in presenting my sequential introduction to the secret world of nuclear planning and decision-making. The dangers revealed to me are dramatized by the actions to which I was led to reduce and avert them.

3. The gist:

published From the late '50's on (with a nuclear race with the Soviets underway), US possession of nuclear weapons was rationalised and legitimated almost entirely in terms of one aim and one eventuality of use (whose probability was to be minimized by a deterrent readiness to retaliate; thus the weapons were deployed "in order never to be launched")

Call that aim, deterrence of surprise nuclear attack, A; and the one eventuality of combat use, occurrence of SU surprise attack, 1.

My mentor at RAND, Albert Wohlstetter (AJW), found that the existing US strategic nuclear force was actually very ill-suited to survive in the one eventuality (he supposed) it was meant to be used. That it was ill-designed to serve its (supposed) single function of deterrence.

To judge its actual ability to deter surprise attack, he proposed that only those remnants that would foreseeably and reliably survive a well-designed enemy attack were relevant (to the enemy's pre-attack calculations underlying its decision to attack: assuming that this decision would be sensitive to such calculations). This might be a very small fraction of the existing pre-attack US force.

I quickly learned at RAND (in the summer of 1958) that there

was another eventuality that could lead to launch of the US force: call it 2, the apparent imminence of Soviet attack, signalled either by tactical (electronic, infrared) warning or by "strategic warning."

Apparently (as I first was led to believe) this reflected an awareness, on both sides, of this very vulnerability. Unless US forces were launched (perhaps on positive control, not yet committing them to attack targets) on warning, before enemy vehicles arrived, there could be no retaliation at all, and this prospect would undermine and perhaps negate deterrence.

But 2 is not a simple, single state of the world. An appearance of imminent attack, in varying degrees of certainty or subjective probability, could arise in a variety of circumstances, many of which would be "false alarms" not reflecting any immediate Soviet intentions or actions to initiate attack. Thus, in judging the likelihood that US weapons might actually be launched, the possible eventualities are expanded to 3, 4...n, unless "2" is interpreted to be a class of situations sharing signs of imminent Soviet attack on US forces.

AJW argued persuasively that even given this readiness to launch on warning, a well-designed attack might reduce US retaliatory capability to a very small remnant, because the warning would be ambiguous and the US decision to launch therefore delayed, perhaps fatally.

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(The concepts and propositions here were especially persuasive and interesting to me in 1958 and 1959 because of my particular work in decision theory on ambiguity and responses to it).

In reality, the readiness to launch on warning mainly reflected another US objective altogether for the use of its nuclear weapons: to reduce damage to the US in the event that strategic nuclear war actually occurred (or, as it was usually put, misleadingly as we shall see, "in case deterrence failed"), by destroying Soviet nuclear forces (before they were launched).

on approach that it

This aim--call it B--called for a different set of targets and for different priorities and urgencies in terms of timing and US capabilities. Such considerations implied quite different ways of evaluating the adequacy of the US force or improving it. Aim B, "damage reduction," put a great premium on hitting Soviet forces and command centers and communications before those forces were launched at all, or at least while as many of them were on the ground as possible, thus on arriving at their targets early in or if possible prior to actual Soviet launch.

*might have failed
or, we
provided
rather than
destroyed.*

To this end, survivability of US forces under Soviet attack might not be necessary, and might not even contribute. Certain ways of making US forces more survivable would even lessen their

ability to limit damage to the US, by slowing their response to warning.

AJW and his colleagues mostly assumed that aim B was generally subordinate to aim A, to be considered and pursued only to the extent possible after the fullest possible efforts to achieve A. But this did not reflect Air Force priorities at all and amounted to a misunderstanding of the considerations and objectives that led to the actual design and operation of the force.

This was true especially because there were actually several other objectives, all highly compatible with pursuit of aim B (much less so with expensive pursuit of A, which was actually seen as having much lower relevance and priority), whose significance was either unknown to AJW and his RAND colleagues and greatly underrated by them. (Again, this amounted to a misunderstanding by them of the purposes, functions and relevant characteristics of the US force as seen by the Air Force and their superiors. To the extent that RAND perceived the Air Force and Administration priorities but saw them as misguided, this reflected RAND ignorance of the strategic context, in particular size and characteristics of Soviet forces, as it was secretly seen, fairly realistically, by the officials. The officials fostered this ignorance, in part because they shared a self-servingly mistaken view of Soviet long-term intentions).

Aim C: to deter Soviet attack on West Europe, by threat of a US first strike against the Soviet Union (in the event of which, aim B would be paramount).

Aim D: to improve the credibility of US threats of first-use of tactical nuclear weapons against Soviet forces blockading Berlin, or taking limited actions elsewhere in Europe or on its periphery (such as Iran or Turkey), by threatening to escalate up to a US first strike against the Soviet Union if the SU should respond with nuclear weapons to US first-use.

Aim E: likewise, to improve the credibility of US threats of first-use of tactical nuclear weapons in the Third World, especially against allies or clients of the Soviet Union, by threatening a first-strike against the SU if the Soviets should use tactical nuclear weapons in support of such US adversaries in response to US first-use (or otherwise).

The US was relying on first-use threats of tactical weapons to defend Berlin, its allies in Europe and elsewhere (e.g., South Korea), and to deter Soviet moves "against US interests" elsewhere (e.g., against Iran or other countr

ies in the Middle East, to defend its own allies or clients such as Cuba or India).

These threats could be hardly be credible enough to be effective if the US had no basis for deterring, or believing that it might deter, Soviet nuclear response in kind, which would be at the least totally destructive of the ally or interests the US was trying to protect.

The basis for believing (to some degree) that the Soviets might not respond at all with their own tactical nuclear weapons to US tactical nuclear attack on their own forces or their allies' was that the Soviet would perceive that the US was ready in such circumstances to launch a disarming first strike against the Soviet Union. And the credibility of the latter counter-threat depended on US ability, in this case, to achieve aim B, reducing or averting damage to the US from Soviet strategic nuclear forces.

Finally, perhaps above all, there was aim F, to increase the Air Force budget, the size of the strategic forces, and the continued development of advanced aerospace technology. (This aim, in all its aspects, was shared not only by the Air Force but by the corporations and communities and unions depending on Air Force contracts, on the desires for profits and jobs, and by the politicians in Congress and the Administration depending on votes and campaign contributions reflecting their support of the industry).

This last objective was, on the whole, much better served by focus on aim B--which promoted larger force size and relied on advanced and continually developing technology--than on aim A. Aim A, survivability, led to proposals by RAND for pouring concrete--for revetments for bombers, silos for missiles--rather than for building more numerous airplanes that would fly higher and faster with ever-increasingly advanced electronics (the B-70, later the B-1 and B-2). Such RAND proposals competed within Air Force budgets with what the Air Force really wanted. And they could even encourage US budget money to go outside the Air Force altogether, toward Polaris submarines.

For the same reason, and other diplomatic and strategic reasons, there was an emphasis on aims C, D and E, which together (with F) really determined the scale and shape of the US strategic nuclear forces. To understand this is to comprehend many aspects of the force "posture" that otherwise (from the perspective of aim A alone, or as seen by RAND in the late-Fifties) seemed inexplicable, incompetent, wasteful, and dangerous.

That is, it is to see them as coherent, purposive, non-random. It is not to say they were not dangerous (nor that there was not, even after these other objectives and their impact are recognized, much waste, incompetence, and random, uncontrolled, accidental features enlarging the dangers).

On the contrary, the effect of pursuing these multiple aims

was greatly to expand the set of eventualities in which the US threatened, was ready, and might actually be led to launch nuclear weapons, in most cases before any adversary had decided to do so. And in nearly all of these cases (perhaps, really, all of them) such launch would be grotesquely harmful to the interests of the US and its allies and to all humanity.

Moreover, the US and Soviet Union had been led, in secret (and in response to such secret, largely denied or obscured aims) to construct vast, complex systems of nuclear destruction that were subject to accidents, unauthorised actions, and above all to false alarms, unprecedented dangers which added to the dangers (above) of the deliberate carrying out of threats and plans by highest authorities acting on the basis of realistic information.

(The latter dangers are so secret and unknown or underrated by most people, not only in the public but by most "experts" and scholars, that the former risk of accidents and false alarms are seen as the only dangers. Great as these risks are, they are not the only ones, or in my opinion, even the main ones. That situation is likely to be reproduced in newly proliferating Third World regions, and it is likely to misperceived there as well).

Thus, even if eventuality 2 above is seen as a large class of possible states of the world, it must be joined by 3, 4,n (n very large) of situations, all with positive probability, that might evoke US first-use or first-strike, on the basis of existing US preparations, readiness, plans and threats, and the conceptions of officials and advisors. The overall probability has always been very much greater than nearly any commentator has realized, or even most officials within the government.

And most proposals for reducing the dangers that were perceived have failed to address the hidden motives that have sustained them and have been essentially disregarded by officials influenced by those motives. Unaware of the motives and the interest groups behind them, critics and adversaries of the nuclear buildup and posture have generally failed to expose, argue against, or mobilise political opposition to them.

The same motives, groups, and conceptions can be seen in India, Pakistan and other prospective proliferators, operating under the same secrecy and public ignorance, with the likelihood of reproducing the same dangerous follies on a regional scale. The likely result will be regional nuclear wars and terrorist actions each of which will be irreparably destructive beyond any prior precedent, even if they do not immediately threaten human survival (as a possible US-Russian conflict continues to do, even though with much lower probability in the short run).

4. My story is one of discovering, in turn, aims A through F, and the expanding realm of contingencies that could evoke nuclear

war, in my work from 1953 to 1964 and beyond. My pursuit of aim A led me almost immediately into some of the most closely-guarded secrets of all, in nuclear war planning, alert posture, and command and control arrangements, exposing dangers known to very few at most and in some cases to no one else.